The seminar will explore some aspects of the relation between moral psychology and moral philosophy, with attention to empirical findings and their bearing on normative and metanormative questions. Among the works we read will be Philip Kitcher’s book The Moral Project, which proposes naturalistic ways of doing moral philosophy that are sharply different from predominant traditions, and Jonathan Haidt’s Righteous Minds (2012), which reviews findings of the social psychology of morality. Some time ago, in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990), I offered a speculative account of moral judgment treated as a natural phenomenon, drawing, among other things, on evolutionary theory. In the time since then, the psychology of morality has been greatly developed. The subject is vast, and we can’t do more than to sample some works of importance in these broad areas, asking what we should now say, in light of developments of the past two decades, about the nature of moral judgment and how to pursue moral inquiry.