Distinguish the questions:
- Is a scientific explanation of consciousness possible?
- In what broad direction does a correct account lie?
- Are we there yet? Are we there yet? Are we there yet?
Most philosophical writing on consciousness over the last 30 years has patiently addressed (1) and (2), and if anything answered “of course not” to (3). By contrast in this seminar, we’ll assess a handful of less-patient theories of conscious experience that have some claim to being nearly complete. These include theories centered around cognitive influence (Dennett), higher-order thoughts (Carruthers), inner perceptions (Lycan), first-order perceptions (Tye), and panpsychism (Chalmers).
Such theories have implications for the broader choice-points for (2)—physicalism, representationalism, and so on. They also need to incorporate or at least assume responses to the doubts about (1)—the explanatory gap, zombies, Mary, and so on. And they have different implications for animals, babies, computers, and drug-altered states of consciousness. We'll follow out these threads but focus on the comparative (de)merits of the whole proto-scientific packages.
I'll rig up my own carnival milk-bottle pyramid—(1) yep, (2) step right this way, and (3) we're already there—and you please bring your own hardballs to knock it down.