Yulia Paramonova

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Yulia Paramonova

Job Market Candidate

  • Fields of Study
    • Public Economics
      Applied Microeconomic Theory
  • About

    Yulia Paramonova is a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the University of Michigan with interests in public economics and applied microeconomics. Her research focuses on optimal tax enforcement theory. In her dissertation, she proposes and investigates how information provision and innovative enforcement can be used to advance the existing tax system. Her job market paper models information reporting as an enforcement instrument that allows acquiring information about taxpayers' income and affects the accuracy of this information. The paper is the first to introduce information accuracy in the context of tax evasion. The paper finds that the optimal level of information reporting depends on the budget as an inverse U-shaped function. This implies that there is a budget at which it is no longer optimal to expand the information reporting system. Her other research investigates the potential benefits of imposing collateral tax sanctions for tax noncompliance. An example of collateral tax sanctions is driver’s license suspension. Her research proposes that collateral tax sanctions may be a more efficient way to collect taxes than monetary penalties. Also her research examines the effectiveness of collateral tax sanctions for the purpose of tax debt collection. Prior to starting her Ph.D., Yulia received a B.S. and M.S. in applied mathematics and physics at Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, and an M.A. in economics at New Economic School.

    Dissertation Abstract

    The Optimal Deterrence of Tax Evasion: The Trade-off between Information Reporting and Audits — Job Market Paper


    Joel Slemrod
    Department of Economics
    University of Michigan

    James Hines Jr
    Department of Economics
    University of Michigan

    Tilman Borgers
    Department of Economics
    University of Michigan