Our very own Professor Ezra Keshet will deliver our colloquium talk this Friday. Ezra is a specialist on semantics, with a specific focus on how context impacts the interpretation of sentential meaning. In his presentation on Friday, he will focus on two case studies that show that context is crucial to determining even the truth-conditional meaning of utterances. This presentation takes on long standing assumptions in the field of formal semantics, and underscores the importance of taking into account also broader discourse contexts in semantics. The title, abstract and information about the time and place and time of the presentation is given below.
What: Colloquium Talk
Where: 2001 LSA Building
When: Friday, 2/22, 4 pm
Two Effects of Context on TruthConditional Meaning
The lexical items and syntactic structure of a sentence play a large role in its interpretation, but other factors often contribute as well, such as the time/place of utterance, other sentences in the same discourse, salient surrounding objects; extralinguistic goals; and more. This talk presents case studies highlighting the semantic effects of two such suprasentential factors: focus/information structure, and discourse coherence.
The first study involves socalled conditional conjunctions such as (1) whose meanings are quite similar to conditional sentences involving the word if as in (2):
(1) You get there early enough, and you usually find a seat.
(2) If you get there early enough, you usually find a seat.
I will present evidence that such sentences require a particular information structure, namely one where the first clause is Given in the context (or accommodated as Given). I argue that the conditional meaning results from the interaction between a modal quantifier such as usually in (1) and this information structure. A standard ifclause generally serves to restrict a modal quantifier (see Kratzer 1986) and since Given material tends to join the restriction of quantifier as well, this information structure mimics the effect of an ifclause.
The second study examines how discourse coherence can constrain pronoun referents in a way previously thought to require syntactic ccommand. Coherence is the name for the unspoken links between clauses in discourse, as shown in (3), which is most easily understood to mean (4):
(3) John flew to Boston. He’s giving a talk at a conference.
(4) John flew to Boston because he’s giving a talk at a conference.
Hobbs (1979) noted that the establishment of such coherence relations also constrains pronoun reference, for instance constraining he in (3) to refer to John when the discourse is understood as in (4). Ross (1967) described two readings for pronouns in ellipsis, as shown in (5). Most linguists, following Reinhart (1983), claim that the sloppy reading requires a ccommanding antecedent, such as Bill, which ccommands his in (5). I argue instead that discourse coherence constraints on pronouns can also generate sloppy reading, as shown in (6) and (7).
(5) Bill loves his dog. John does, too.
a. ...John loves Bill’s dog, too. (strict reading)
b. ...John loves John’s dog, too. (sloppy reading)
(6) The man who called Jane asked her out.
The man who emailed Vera did ask Vera out, too.
(7) Kennedy looked good on TV. People voted for him.
Nixon looked bad on TV. People didn’t vote for Nixon.