Professor Lasonen-Aarnio joined the department in Fall 2010. Before coming to Michigan she received a DPhil from Oxford in 2009, and worked in Merton College as a research fellow. Her research lies primarily in epistemology, though her interests range from metaphysics to environmental ethics. She has published papers on closure principles for knowledge, the notion of well-founded belief, defeat of knowledge and justification, knowledge and objective chance, and the incompatibility of the theses of semantic externalism and privileged access. A lot of her work defends an externalist approach in epistemology. She has recently written on peer disagreement and the related issue of how higher-order evidence producing rational self-doubts about one's own cognitive processes ought to be taken into account.
"Rational Reflection and Internalism about Rationality", forthcoming in Oxford
Studies in Epistemology 5.
"Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat", forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
"Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation", forthcoming in Noûs.
"The Dogmatism Puzzle", forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
“Unreasonable knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24.1 (2010) : 1-21.
“Is there a viable account of well-founded belief?” Erkenntnis 72.2 (2010) : 205-321.
“Knowledge and Objective Chance”, with John Hawthorne, in Williamson On Knowledge, P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Oxford University Press, 2009.
“Single premise deduction and risk.” Philosophical Studies 141.2 (2008) : 157-173.
“Why the externalist is better off without free logic: a reply to McKinsey.” Dialectica 62.4 (2008) : 535-540.
“Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of the World: Why Privileged Access is Not the Issue.”Dialectica 60.4 (2006) : 433-445.