Professor Joyce's research concerns the philosophical aspects of probability theory, epistemology, the theory of rational choice, and the general philosophy of science. His book The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory was published by Cambridge University Press in 1999. His recent articles include, "A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probab-ilism," Philosophy of Science 65 (December 1998); "Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision" Philosophy of Science 67 (June 2000), “Levi on Causal Decision Theory and the Possibility of Predicting One’s Own Actions,” Philosophical Studies 110 (2002); “Bayes’ Theorem”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2003 Edition); “Bayesianism,” in A. Mele and P. Rawling, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Rationality, Oxford University Press, (2004); “Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence,” Philosophical Books 45 (2004);  “How Degrees of Belief Reflect Evidence,” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (2005), “Are Newcomb Problems Really Decisions?,” forthcoming in Synthese (2005).