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The evolutionary economics of information use: from simple signals to learning
Decision Consortium Seminar
David Stephens
Thursday, November 05, 2009,
3:00 pm – 4:30 pm
3048 EAST HALL
Sponsored By: Evolution & Human Adaptation Program & Decision Consortium
Event Information
Abstract: Animals use signals in many situations: to attract mates, to avoid noxious food items, to defend resources. The value of signals depends, obviously enough, on how potential receivers respond. This presentation develops simple ideas about when receivers should value signals, and argues that these simple principles apply quite generally to situations in which animals use experience to modify their behavior. Part 1 will introduce the basic approach of behavioral ecology and explain how this has been applied to signaling. Following this tradition, I will develop a simple model of 'receiver economics' that emphasizes the interaction between signal reliability and environmental uncertainty. Additionally, I will discuss experimental tests of this model from my laboratory. In part 2, I will review long-standing ideas about the evolution of learning. These ideas emphasize the statistical properties of the environment (e.g. change and predictability), but they have proved very difficult to study. My laboratory has tested these ideas by controlling patterns of change and predictability for Drosophila over many generations. These studies confirm many of our basic claims. Importantly, the principles involved here closely parallel our studies of animal signal use, and this suggests that same basic economic principle may guide information-use in many situations.
Background Readings:
For More InformationEmail: mohrbach@umich.edu
Website URL: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~prestos/Consumption/
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