Tilman Börgers works on game theory and its applications.
In game theory, he has explored the implications of various assumptions regarding players' knowledge about the game that they are playing and about other players' rationality. He has also studied models in which players play a game repeatedly, and use simple learning algorithms to adjust their strategies. Börgers' research on applications of game theory concerns auctions, voting and, more generally, mechanism design.
He has advised several government agencies on auctions of spectrum licenses and on gas and electricity auctions

Strange Bids: Bidding Behaviour in the United Kingdom’s Third Generation Spectrum Auction, Economic Journal 115 (2005), 551-578.

Costly Voting, American Economic Review 94 (2004), 57-66.

Expedient and Monotone Learning Rules, Econometrica 72 (2004), 383–405 (with Antonio Morales and Rajiv Sarin).

Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations, International Economic Review 41 (2000), 921-950 (with Rajiv Sarin).

Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics, Journal of Economic Theory 77 (1997), 1-14 (with Rajiv Sarin).

Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge, Journal of Economic Theory 64 (1994), 265–276.

Pure Strategy Dominance, Econometrica 61 (1993), 423–430.

Iterated Elimination of Dominated Strategies in a Bertrand-Edgeworth Model, Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992), 163–176.

Undominated Strategies and Coordination in Normalform Games, Social Choice and Welfare 8 (1991), 65–78.

Perfect Equilibrium Histories of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games, Journal of Economic Theory 47 (1989), 218–227.