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Designing Judicial Review: Interest Groups, Congress, and Communications Policy
Author(s): Charles Shipan
Members of Congress and interest groups fiercely struggle over the seemingly unimportant procedural details of legislation, such as the provisions for judicial review. In a study based on a detailed consideration of congressional debates over communications legislation, Shipan argues that actors realize that current procedural choices will structure future alternatives and thus are willing to expend considerable resources over these issues. Using a rational choice framework, Shipan argues that provisions for judicial review, such as the specification of which agency actions are reviewable and which courts have review authority, are among the issues over which interested parties struggle because these issues will significantly affect the outcome of important future court action. Shipan tests his theory in a detailed exploration of the development of communications legislation during the 1920s and 1930s. Shipan examines the motivations, actions, and choices of both interest groups and members of Congress. He then looks at the impact of the choices made on later court action in communications legislation (Amazon.com).
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Year of Publication: 2000