RIPS: Deliberate Indiscretion: Why agencies make and break rules differently
Existing approaches to the question focus on developed democracies and generally make two assumptions that are problematic in authoritarian and hybrid regimes: leaders care only about implementing a preferred policy, and direct theft from the state is precluded because the bureaucracy is already Weberian. I relax these assumptions in a model of policy implementation where an agency starts off incompetent and the politician might grant it greater discretion simply to enable greater theft. Its implications help explain the high degree of intra-state variation in bureaucratic outcomes such as corruption across non-OECD states. This variation is at least as significant as inter-state variation in 'average' corruption.
Please note that RIPS will be meeting in the Eldersveld Room at 3:30PM on Friday, a change from the normal time. We look forward to seeing you there.