Action has been seldom recognized as being in itself a kind of conceptual episode. The prevailing view has been that voluntary movements derive their meaningfulness and their conditions of correctness from antecedent mental states, intentions. Intentions, in their turn, have been variously interpreted, for example, as consisting of more fundamental psychological, possibly naturalistic, states, like desires or beliefs, or of cognitive and deliberative plans, or as springing from a higher, non natural faculty of willing. (Hume and Kant, together with their contemporary followers, are prominent in this regard.) Against this background, and taking a lead from a minority view that can be traced in the Aristotelian and Wittgensteinian traditions, the course will explore a different theoretical possibility. Action itself, not intention or any other kind of state, might be the fundamental practical state. Action might intrinsically possess content, that is of a distinctive, practical kind and that is conceptual in character. The course will outline a conception of the content of action, along broadly Fregean lines, and connect such conception with issues like the normative assessment of action practical reasoning.