In this seminar we will explore the revival of interest in sentimentalist metaethical theories. These theories hold that at least some emotions are not mere sensitivities to independently existing values (as perhaps fear is to danger), but play a constitutive role in creating values or giving content to evaluative judgments. Such disparate views as the sensibility theories of McDowell and Wiggins, as well as the expressivism of Gibbard and Blackburn, share this sentimentalism framework. We will be exploring the foundations of such views, paying special attention to their commitments to the rational appraisal of the sentiments. We will also consider relevant issues in the philosophy of emotion: in particular, cognitivism, the phenomenon of recalcitrant emotions, and issues concerning putative "standing" emotions which are not bouts of feeling but long-term attitudes. The course will be organized around an eponymous book manuscript in progress, coauthored with Justin D'Arms.