We will evaluate the arguments for and against identifying the will with reason in its practical capacity. To this end, we will consider the conceptual relationships among self-determined behavior, self-endorsed behavior, and behavior that reflects a commitment to an action-guiding principle. We will explore challenges to the thesis that it is not possible to will against one's own "best judgment." We will then turn to features of agency that appear to count against identifying the will with practical reason even if the two are necessarily in harmony. Possible texts include: excerpts from Plato, Hume, Kant, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and O'Shaughnessy; papers by Bratman, Davidson, Frankfurt, Holton, Korsgaard, Mele, Stocker, Velleman, Wallace, and Watson. We may also consider some of the psychology literature (e.g., Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will).